APK-Editor-MCP-Server

The server uses subprocess calls extensively, which are generally handled safely by passing arguments as lists, mitigating direct shell injection. However, the `file_utils` functions (e.g., `file_read`, `file_write`, `file_delete`, `file_copy`, `file_move`, `file_patch`, `file_insert`) take arbitrary `file_path` or `dir_path` arguments. This design permits a malicious client (or an agent controlled by a malicious user) to read, write, or delete files anywhere on the host system where the server process has permissions. This represents a significant sandbox escape vulnerability. Additionally, regular expression-based operations (e.g., `fast_manifest_patch`, `search_text`) could be susceptible to ReDoS (Regular expression Denial of Service) if user-provided patterns are not properly validated or sanitized by the MCP client. The system relies on several external Java JARs (`APKEditor.jar`, `dex-editor.jar`, `jadx-core`) and system tools (`apksigner`, `adb`), whose security and integrity are critical. Hardcoded debug keystore credentials are used as a default, which is standard for Android development but highlights the potential for misuse if not understood by the user.