kom

The project allows powerful Kubernetes operations, including creating privileged pods (`CreateNodeShell`, `CreateKubectlShell` functions in `kom/ctl_node.go`) with `privileged: true`, `hostNetwork: true`, `hostPID: true`, and broad tolerations. This constitutes a significant privilege escalation vector if access to the MCP server is not rigorously controlled. The basic HTTP header-based `authKey` mechanism in `main.go` is illustrative and implies that robust external authentication and authorization are required, but not built-in. Kubeconfig handling (loading from paths, strings, or generated from AWS credentials) is a critical component that can be exploited if sources are untrusted. AWS credentials, if hardcoded in examples and used verbatim by users, pose a severe risk. File operations within pods and SQL-like querying of Kubernetes resources introduce additional attack surfaces that need careful validation and authorization checks to prevent unintended data exposure or manipulation.