mcp-dblp

The primary security consideration is the `export_bibtex` tool, which allows writing BibTeX content to an arbitrary user-specified file path. While the content is controlled (BibTeX fetched directly from DBLP), an unconstrained LLM could potentially specify a sensitive file path (e.g., `/etc/passwd.bib`) leading to unintended file creation or overwrites, assuming the server's process has write permissions at that location. This risk needs to be managed by the calling environment or LLM through proper path sanitization. The `subprocess.Popen` usage in `src/mcp_dblp/tools.py` is for internal testing/tooling and does not execute arbitrary user commands. No `eval()` calls, hardcoded secrets, or other obvious arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities were found. External API calls to DBLP include timeouts and an identifying User-Agent.