3AmigosMCP

The container is configured with significant permissions that introduce security risks if not understood and managed properly. Specifically: 1. Playwright runs with `--no-sandbox`, disabling Chrome's security sandbox, which is a known risk for browser automation, especially when interacting with untrusted web content. 2. The container mounts the host's `/workspace` directory with read/write (`rw`) permissions. This means the container and any process within it (including the MCP servers) have full access to modify or delete files in that host directory. A compromise of any MCP server or the container itself could lead to host filesystem manipulation. 3. The recommended 'Command-Based Mode' for client configuration uses `docker exec`, which grants the client (e.g., Cursor/VS Code) direct execution capabilities within the container. While this eliminates persistent HTTP connections, it means the client effectively controls command execution inside the highly-privileged container. 4. The HTTP wrappers for Filesystem and Database MCPs (on ports 8082/8083 internal, 8092/8093 external) use `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, which is broadly permissive if these ports were exposed beyond localhost to an untrusted network. However, the recommended usage is `docker exec` (stdio) or local HTTP access. It is crucial for users to understand these risks, particularly the `rw` volume mount and `--no-sandbox` flag, and only run this in a trusted development environment.