taigaMcpServer

The server uses `dotenv` to load credentials from `.env` files, preventing hardcoding of secrets. Input validation for tool parameters is implemented using `zod`, which is a good practice for mitigating injection attacks. However, the `uploadAttachmentFromPath` tool (used internally by `uploadAttachment` when `filePath` is provided) directly takes a `filePath` parameter from user input and reads the content using `fs.readFileSync`. Although it attempts to resolve paths to common locations (`process.cwd()`, `os.homedir()`, `Desktop`, `Downloads`) or absolute paths, this pattern can be vulnerable to Local File Inclusion (LFI) if an attacker can craft a malicious `filePath` to read arbitrary files from the server's file system (e.g., by using directory traversal `../`). Running this server in an environment where user input to `filePath` is not strictly controlled or sandboxed could pose a significant security risk.