mcp-ticketer

The system is generally robust, employing Pydantic for input validation, environment variables for sensitive credentials (which are also masked in logs), and parameterized SQL queries to prevent injection. However, specific operations warrant caution: - **Path Traversal**: The `ticket_hierarchy` and `attachment` tools accept `file_path` or `project_path` arguments directly. If an AI agent's input for these paths is unsanitized and controlled by a malicious actor, it could lead to arbitrary local file access, reading, or overwriting on the host system where the MCP server is running (e.g., via `file_path='/etc/passwd'`). Similarly, `os.chdir(project_path)` in the server's main entry point, if `project_path` is untrusted, could set the working directory to a malicious location. - **Information Disclosure**: While credentials are handled via environment variables and configuration files (like `.env.local`), and masked in logs, a user misconfiguring by committing `.env.local` to a public repository would expose secrets.