ollama-fastmcp-wrapper

The primary security concern stems from the LLM's ability to invoke FastMCP tools based on user input. If a malicious user can craft prompts that trick the LLM into calling dangerous tools (if any are configured beyond the benign examples) or passing exploitable arguments to legitimate tools, it could lead to vulnerabilities like arbitrary code execution or information disclosure. The default binding of the API server to `0.0.0.0` (accessible from any network interface) without built-in authentication further increases risk, allowing unauthorized network access. Additionally, the `StdioTransport` mechanism for spawning local MCP servers could be a vector for arbitrary command execution if the `mcp_servers_config.toml` file is improperly configured with malicious commands by an administrator. While the `__coerce_parameters` function attempts basic type coercion, it is not a comprehensive input sanitizer against all forms of malicious tool arguments. The server relies on careful configuration and secure LLM prompting practices.