dataql

The system directly executes SQL queries and utilizes file paths (for both input and output) provided by the LLM or user. This design, while enabling powerful functionality, poses significant security risks. Specifically: 1. Arbitrary File Read/Write/Delete: The `source` and `export` parameters allow the tool to read from, write to, and remove arbitrary files on the local file system (e.g., `os.Remove` in export functions). An attacker (or a misbehaving LLM) could craft paths to sensitive system files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`) for exfiltration, modification, or deletion, assuming appropriate process permissions. 2. SQL Injection / Local File Exploits: Although SQL queries run against an embedded SQLite database, SQLite has capabilities for file I/O (e.g., `readfile`, `writefile` if extensions are loaded or custom functions are registered). A malicious SQL query could attempt to read or write local files. Additionally, providing connection strings for external databases (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB) directly from user/LLM input introduces a risk of exploiting vulnerabilities in those database systems or their drivers. 3. Resource Exhaustion: Processing large remote files from URLs or cloud storage (S3, GCS, Azure) specified by an attacker could lead to excessive disk/memory usage. It is critical to run this tool in a tightly sandboxed environment (e.g., a Docker container with restricted volume mounts, limited network access, and a non-privileged user) and only with trusted LLM inputs.