Blender-MCP-Server

The server exposes a large set of Blender's internal API functions (`bpy` module operations) over a network interface (defaulting to 0.0.0.0, making it accessible externally if not firewalled). Malicious actors could potentially use this to execute arbitrary Blender operations, corrupt files, or crash the application, especially if the `polymcp_toolkit` or AI agent's input validation is insufficient. The AI agent orchestration also introduces prompt injection risks, where a malicious prompt could trick the AI into issuing destructive commands. Furthermore, `Config.POLYMCP_PATH` is a user-configurable path that is appended to `sys.path`, presenting a potential arbitrary code injection vulnerability if its value is compromised or set to an untrusted location. No direct `eval()` or similar explicit dynamic code execution is observed in the provided code, but the indirect risks are substantial.