reachy-mini-mcp

The server uses dynamic loading of Python scripts from a controlled 'tools_repository/scripts' directory for tool execution via `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location` and `spec.loader.exec_module`. While this is dynamic code execution, it's safer than `eval()` or `exec()` of arbitrary strings, which the `INLINE_REMOVAL_SUMMARY.md` explicitly states have been removed. The `tts_queue.py` module utilizes `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` to interact with `piper` (TTS) and `aplay` (audio playback); inputs for these commands appear to be reasonably handled (e.g., text via stdin, temporary files for audio) to mitigate injection risks. No obvious hardcoded secrets were found, with environment variables used for configuration. If `server_openai.py` is used, it binds to `0.0.0.0` which means it can be externally accessible if the host's firewall permits, posing a standard network exposure risk. The most significant inherent security consideration is the power of the `operate_robot` tool, especially in its 'sequence mode', when controlled by an external, potentially unconstrained LLM, which could lead to unintended or potentially destructive robot actions.