umjiniti-probe

The application relies heavily on executing shell commands (`nmap`, `iperf3`, `traceroute`, `tcpdump`, `dnstraceroute`) via `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell` and `sshpass` with user-provided string inputs (`options`, `host`, `target`, `scripts`, `packetlength`, `server`, `interface`, `cap_count`, `duration`). There is no visible input sanitization or escaping of these parameters before they are interpolated into shell commands. This creates critical command injection vulnerabilities, allowing an attacker (or a compromised LLM) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system (due to `network_mode: "host"` and `cap_add: NET_ADMIN` in Docker) or remote SSH targets. The use of `sshpass` directly with passwords in `run_ssh_cmd` is also a security concern for credential handling. The `init.sh` script modifies host firewall rules, disabling UFW and opening several ports, which alters the host's security posture. A hardcoded `SNMP_COMMUNITY='public'` is present.