contractor

The system presents critical security risks. The `http` validation type allows for direct command injection via the `url` parameter (e.g., `url: "http://example.com'; rm -rf /;"`) which is embedded into a shell script executed within a Docker container. This constitutes a severe Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Additionally, the `command` validation type allows agents to propose arbitrary shell commands for execution in a container. While human approval is required, detecting malicious or exploitable command sequences in complex validation specs is extremely difficult and error-prone. The `mcp-toolkit-manifest.json` explicitly mounts the host's Docker socket (`/var/run/docker.sock`) into the server's container and thus into the validation containers, granting them root privileges over the entire Docker daemon, which can lead to host compromise if any RCE vulnerability is exploited. Furthermore, the `ValidationRunner.ts` mounts the `workspacePath` (provided by the client, which could be any host path) into validation containers without explicitly enforcing read-only access (e.g. `src:dest:ro`), meaning by default, these containers have write access to potentially arbitrary host directories, posing a significant data integrity risk if combined with RCE.