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Vetted Servers(9120)

0
0
Low Cost
qinghai5060 icon

mcp115

by qinghai5060

Sec2

This server acts as an API gateway for LLMs to interact with 115 cloud storage, enabling file management operations.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️The 115driver API is noted to have changed, leading to potential functional limitations or breakage.
  • ⚠️The server's API for username/password login (115.login) is *mocked* to always succeed in the current implementation, meaning it does not perform actual authentication with 115 cloud. This makes the server completely insecure for production use.
  • ⚠️Session information is persisted unencrypted in JSON files on the local filesystem (default './sessions'), which is a significant security risk for sensitive data.
Review RequiredView Analysis
The primary security vulnerability is in the `internal/api/auth.go`'s `handleLogin` function. It uses `internal/api/driver_wrapper.go`'s `Login` method, which is a mock implementation that unconditionally returns success (`return nil`). This means the MCP server's '115.login' API command will grant a valid session to *any* provided username and password, without actually authenticating with the 115 cloud service. This makes the server completely insecure if exposed. Additionally, session information (SessionID, UserID, Username, etc.) is stored in plaintext JSON files on disk (defaulting to './sessions'), posing a significant information leakage risk if the storage directory is compromised or improperly secured. While the README suggests cookie-based login for a CLI tool, the server API directly exposes a username/password login that is broken by design.
Updated: 2025-11-30GitHub→
0
0
High Cost
andbet39 icon

selenium_mcp

by andbet39

Sec4

Provides web automation capabilities using Selenium WebDriver, enabling an MCP agent to control web browsers for various tasks.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires Node.js (version >=18) to be installed on the host machine.
  • ⚠️Requires Chrome, Firefox, or Edge browsers and their respective WebDriver executables to be installed and accessible on the host system.
  • ⚠️When using SSE transport, the default port (3001) must be available and not blocked by a firewall.
  • ⚠️The SSE transport exposes an open API (CORS '*') without authentication, necessitating careful network isolation if deployed beyond a trusted local development environment.
Review RequiredView Analysis
The SSE transport is configured with Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) set to `origin: '*'`, allowing requests from any domain. This presents a significant security risk if the server is exposed to untrusted networks, as it lacks explicit authentication or authorization, making it vulnerable to unauthorized command execution. The `take_screenshot` tool allows specifying an `outputPath`, which could lead to arbitrary file write vulnerabilities if an attacker can control this path and the server has write permissions to sensitive areas. An unusual debug log string ('QUESTO LOG E' IMPORTANTISSIMO...') is present in the server's main file, which is atypical for production code.
Updated: 2025-11-27GitHub→
0
0
Low Cost
pmkhairnarr icon

website-builder-mcp

by pmkhairnarr

Sec6

Automated generation of websites from templates and structured data, including Excel files.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires an MCP-compatible client (e.g., VS Code extension, Claude Desktop) to interact with the server's tools.
  • ⚠️Generated websites may contain XSS vulnerabilities if the input data (Excel or explicit HTML content) is untrusted and includes malicious scripts.
Verified SafeView Analysis
The server uses `fs-extra` for file system operations (creating directories, reading/writing files). While `path.join` is used for site and page names, which helps mitigate basic path traversal for output paths, the `excelFile` argument in `build_from_excel` takes an arbitrary path. If the server runs with broad file system permissions, a malicious input for `excelFile` could potentially read sensitive files (e.g., `../../../../etc/passwd`). Additionally, the server uses `Mustache.render` with triple curly braces (`{{{content}}}`) for embedding user-provided HTML content. This means that if malicious HTML (e.g., `<script>alert('XSS')</script>`) is provided as an argument to `add_page` or embedded within Excel data, it will be directly injected into the generated HTML files. While this doesn't directly compromise the MCP server's execution, it enables the generation of websites vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), which then poses a risk to end-users browsing the generated sites. Users should ensure inputs (especially `excelFile` paths and HTML content) come from trusted sources.
Updated: 2025-11-30GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
Sec7

Manages n8n automation workflows using natural language through Claude AI.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires a running n8n instance with a valid API key.
  • ⚠️Requires Python 3.11 or higher.
  • ⚠️HTTP mode (for remote access) can be unauthenticated by default if MCP_AUTH_TOKEN is not set, posing a security risk.
Verified SafeView Analysis
The HTTP mode's optional authentication token (`MCP_AUTH_TOKEN`) means it can be unauthenticated by default, which is a significant security risk if deployed publicly without configuration. CORS is enabled by default in `aiohttp` for HTTP mode; the documentation recommends restricting this in production via a reverse proxy. No hardcoded secrets or obvious malicious patterns found. All API keys and sensitive configurations are handled via environment variables, which is a good practice.
Updated: 2026-01-19GitHub→
0
0
Low Cost
cocolizh icon

consoleapp1-demo

by cocolizh

Sec1

Unable to determine use case as no source code was provided for analysis.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Source code not provided for analysis.
Review RequiredView Analysis
Source code was not provided for analysis. Therefore, a security audit could not be performed. It is NOT safe to run this server without a thorough review of its source code.
Updated: 2025-11-25GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
ArthurTcs icon

mcp-server-gti

by ArthurTcs

Sec8

This MCP server provides an interface to Google's Threat Intelligence suite, enabling programmatic access to threat data, IOC analysis, and threat hunting capabilities.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires a VirusTotal API Key (VT_APIKEY environment variable) which may be a paid service depending on usage limits and features needed.
  • ⚠️Requires Python 3.11 or higher.
  • ⚠️Designed to run as an MCP server, requiring an MCP client for interaction.
Verified SafeView Analysis
The server uses `os.getenv` for `VT_APIKEY`, which is good practice. No 'eval' or obvious obfuscation is present. All external API calls are handled by the `vt-py` library. The `analyse_file` function allows uploading local files for analysis. If the server or an agent using this tool is exposed to untrusted inputs, providing arbitrary file paths could be a concern, although the tool itself sends the file to an external service (VirusTotal) rather than executing it locally. The `create_collection` and `update_iocs_in_collection` tools modify data on Google Threat Intelligence, implying that the `VT_APIKEY` should have appropriate, least-privilege permissions. Overall, the code follows good security practices, but the security depends heavily on the scope of the provided `VT_APIKEY` and how the tool's file upload/data modification capabilities are managed in deployment.
Updated: 2025-12-03GitHub→
0
0
Low Cost

mcp-server-repo

by tahir-ansari-nv

Sec5

This repository likely contains a server component for a system abbreviated as MCP, potentially related to network communication or a proxy application, though specifics are unknown.

Review RequiredView Analysis
Insufficient information to perform a meaningful security audit. Only a repository title was provided. Cannot check for 'eval', obfuscation, or specific network risks without any code or further documentation.
Updated: 2025-11-17GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
Sec6

Provides a framework for building Micro-Communication Protocol (MCP) servers with basic authentication and tool-calling capabilities, primarily for integration with Large Language Models.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires OpenAI API Key (Paid) for client-LLM interaction (OPENAI_API_KEY environment variable).
  • ⚠️Requires `mcp` Python package and its dependencies (e.g., `uvicorn`, `starlette`, `pydantic`, `python-dotenv`).
Verified SafeView Analysis
Hardcoded credentials in `app/users.json` (e.g., admin:password123, testuser:secret) are a significant security risk. The `BasicAuthMiddleware` uses Base64 encoded credentials, which are not encrypted and require HTTPS for secure transmission in production. Input validation with Pydantic is a positive security practice.
Updated: 2025-12-25GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
rxxed icon

mamcp

by rxxed

Sec8

Search for torrents on MyAnonamouse and trigger downloads via qBittorrent from an MCP client.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires a MyAnonamouse account and a valid session cookie (MAM_COOKIE).
  • ⚠️Requires a running qBittorrent instance with Web UI/API access enabled, along with its URL, username, password, and desired save path.
  • ⚠️The `.env` file is attempted to be loaded from a hardcoded path (`/home/maia/work/mamcp/.env`); users should ensure environment variables are exported directly as specified in the README, rather than relying on a `.env` file in the current directory.
Verified SafeView Analysis
The server handles sensitive credentials (MyAnonamouse session cookie, qBittorrent login) which are loaded from environment variables. No hardcoded secrets or 'eval' patterns were found. Input validation for tool calls uses `mcp-go` library functions. The qBittorrent integration downloads torrent files based on an ID and uploads them; while standard, this implies trust in the source of the torrents and the qBittorrent client's robustness against malicious torrent files. A hardcoded path for `.env` file loading (`/home/maia/work/mamcp/.env`) is present, which is unusual for a deployable server and might lead to setup issues if not managed via exported environment variables. The server provides warnings if required environment variables are not set.
Updated: 2025-12-11GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
valyushok icon

mcp_speechkit

by valyushok

Sec3

A server application designed to provide speech-to-text or text-to-speech functionalities, likely integrating with external speech APIs or models.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Source code not provided, so specific setup requirements are unknown. Typically, speech applications require API keys for cloud services (e.g., GOOGLE_SPEECH_KEY, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID) or local model dependencies.
Review RequiredView Analysis
Source code was not provided for analysis, making a comprehensive security audit impossible. The score is defaulted to low due to an unknown security posture. Potential risks common to server applications (e.g., injection vulnerabilities, insecure dependencies, misconfigurations, or hardcoded secrets) cannot be assessed.
Updated: 2025-11-30GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost
rlyeh-dev icon

yith

by rlyeh-dev

Sec6

An Odin-based MCP Server SDK designed for sandboxed Lua code execution by LLMs to enable code-agent capabilities.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires Odin compiler for development and execution.
  • ⚠️Designed for standard I/O (stdio) communication only; no HTTP server provided.
  • ⚠️Relies on a specific Lua 5.4 runtime environment.
Review RequiredView Analysis
The core functionality involves LLM-provided code execution in an 'in-process Lua sandbox'. While Lua sandboxing can be robust, an in-process sandbox is generally less secure than containerized solutions (e.g., Docker) against sandbox escapes. The security relies heavily on correct configuration by the developer to limit exposed Lua APIs and prevent access to sensitive system resources. No obvious network risks from the server itself as it uses stdio, but exposed Lua functions could potentially introduce them.
Updated: 2025-11-28GitHub→
0
0
Medium Cost

xvinexus-mcp-server

by xTeknoTaube

Sec8

Deploying a remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server on Cloudflare Workers to expose custom AI tools.

Setup Requirements

  • ⚠️Requires a Cloudflare account for deployment.
  • ⚠️The server is deployed without authentication, making any exposed tools publicly accessible; users must implement their own authentication for production or sensitive use cases.
  • ⚠️Connecting from local MCP clients (e.g., Claude Desktop) requires installing and configuring the 'mcp-remote' proxy.
Verified SafeView Analysis
The example server is explicitly designed 'without auth,' meaning it's publicly accessible. While this simplifies the example, deploying custom tools, especially those accessing sensitive data or functions, without implementing authentication would pose a significant security risk. No 'eval' or obfuscation is apparent from the provided file list and README. The overall safety depends on the tools added by the user.
Updated: 2025-11-17GitHub→
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